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1 Introduction
Markets di¤er in the degree in which trade is centralized. Call markets, used to set
opening prices on the NYSE, are highly centralized and all trade takes place at a
single price (the market clearing price). In contrast, in housing, labor, or used car
markets, trade is highly decentralized, and prices are determined by bilateral bargain-
ing between buyers and sellers, and may di¤er between trades. The competitive model
abstracts away from these institutional aspects, thus providing a model suitable, in
principle, for the study of both centralized and decentralized markets. Our results
suggest that decentralized markets with adverse selection may perform better than
anticipated by the static-competitive model, and therefore that these institutional
features cannot be ignored.
It is known that in markets for homogenous goods, decentralized trade tends
to yield competitive outcomes when trading frictions are small. Since competitive
equilibrium is e¢ cient in these markets, this implies that decentralized trade generates
nearly e¢ cient outcomes. In markets with adverse selection, however, competitive
equilibria need not be e¢ cient, which raises the possibility that alternative market
structures perform better.
In this paper we study a version of Akerlofs (1970) market for lemons in which
trade is decentralized. Each period an equal measure of buyers and sellers enters the
market; every seller is endowed with a unit of either high or low quality. At each
period every agent in the market has a positive probability of meeting an agent of the
opposite type. Once matched, a buyer, without observing the quality of the sellers
unit, makes a take-it-or-leave-it price o¤er. If the seller accepts, then they trade at
the o¤ered price and both agents exit the market. If the seller rejects the o¤er, then
both agents remain in the market at the next period. Discounting of future gains and
the possible delay in matching with a trading partner constitute trading frictions.
When the average quality of the good held by entering sellers is low, the market
has a unique competitive equilibrium (CE) in which the price equals the buyers
value of a low-quality unit and only low-quality trades. We show that when trade is
decentralized there is trade at several prices and both qualities trade (although with
delay). When frictions are small, decentralized trade yields a surplus greater than
the competitive surplus since the gains realized from trading high-quality units more
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than o¤sets the surplus lost due to trading frictions. As frictions vanish, however,
each traders payo¤converges to his competitive equilibrium payo¤, even though both
high and low-quality units continue to trade.
When average quality is high, the market has an ine¢ cient CE in which only
low-quality trades, as well as e¢ cient CE in which both qualities trade. We nd that
when trade is decentralized all trade is at a price equal to the cost of high-quality
sellers, and both high and low-quality sellers trade as soon as they are matched. Thus,
decentralized trade yields a surplus smaller than the surplus at an e¢ cient CE merely
due to the trading frictions. As frictions vanish, each traders payo¤ converges to his
payo¤ in the e¢ cient CE in which the price is the cost of a high-quality unit.
Key to understanding these results is recognizing that the proportion of sellers
in the market with a high-quality unit need not be the same as the proportion of
sellers entering the market with a high-quality unit. Consider the case where the
average quality of entering sellers is low. We show that in equilibrium buyers mix
over price o¤ers equal to the cost of high quality (such o¤ers are accepted by both
high and low-quality sellers), the value of low-quality (accepted only by low-quality
sellers), and lower prices which are rejected by both types of sellers.1 High-quality
sellers therefore trade at a slower rate than low-quality sellers, and are thus present
in the market in a higher proportion than they enter the market. The mixture over
price o¤ers is such that (i) the expected value of a random unit is equal to the cost
of high quality, and (ii) the reservation price of low-quality sellers equals the value of
low-quality.
Thus, buyers obtain a payo¤ of zero with each type of price o¤er, high-quality
sellers also obtain a payo¤ of zero and, just as in the static competitive equilibrium,
only low-quality sellers capture any surplus. In fact, low-quality sellers obtain more
than their competitive surplus: because a low-quality seller is indi¤erent between
accepting and rejecting an o¤er equal to the value of low quality (his reservation
price), his discounted expected utility is the value of low quality minus the cost of low
quality, i.e., it is his competitive surplus. His undiscounted expected utility therefore
1It is easy to see that equilibrium involves buyers mixing. If all price o¤ers were equal to the
cost of high quality, for example, then both types of sellers trade at the same rate, and therefore the
proportion of high-quality sellers in the market equals the proportion of high-quality sellers entering
the market. Since average quality is low, this o¤er yields a negative payo¤ and hence is not optimal.
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exceeds his static-competitive surplus, but as the discount factor approaches one they
coincide.
It is remarkable that in markets with adverse selection decentralized trade yields
more surplus than anticipated by the competitive model when average quality is
low. This suggests that decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem.2 It is
also interesting to observe that the competitive model does not accurately describe
outcomes in decentralized markets with adverse selection when average quality is
low even if frictions are small: whereas the competitive model predicts that only
low quality trades and that all trade is at one price, with decentralized trade both
qualities trade and there is trade at several prices. Nevertheless, traders obtain
competitive payo¤s as frictions vanish whether average quality is high or low; hence
the competitive model correctly predicts payo¤s.
These results raise the question of whether the static competitive model provides
an appropriate benchmark for competitive outcomes in a dynamic market with ad-
verse selection. We discuss this issue in Section 6.
Related Literature
Results establishing that decentralized trade generates competitive outcomes in
markets for homogenous goods have been obtained by, e.g., Gale (1987) and Binmore
and Herrero (1988) when bargaining is under complete information, and by Serrano
and Yosha (1996) and Moreno and Wooders (1999) when bargaining is under in-
complete information. There are, however, important exceptions to this conclusion
see Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985 and 1990). Except for introducing adverse se-
lection, our model of decentralized trade is standard in Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1985) traders engage in an alternating o¤er bargaining game, while in Gale (1986)
one agent in a match is randomly selected to make a take-it-or-leave-it price o¤er; to
avoid signalling issues, we have the uniformed party (the buyer) make price o¤ers.
The e¢ ciency of decentralized markets with non-negligible frictions has been studied
by Jackson and Palfrey (1999).
The rst paper to consider a matching model with adverse selection is Williamson
2Equilibrium in a decentralized market with one-time entry (rather than a constant ow of
entrants, as considered here) also yields more than the competitive surplus when frictions are small
and average quality is low. See Moreno and Wooders (2001).
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andWright (1994), who show that at money can increase welfare. Also Velde, Weber
and Wright (1999) investigate Greshams Law in a matching model with adverse
selection. Neither of these papers studies the e¢ ciency properties of decentralized
markets in comparison with other market structures. Inderst and Müller (2002) show
that the adverse selection problem may be mitigated if sellers can sort themselves
into di¤erent submarkets.
In a paper concurrent to ours, Blouin (2001) studies a decentralized market for
lemons in a model which di¤ers from ours in that the probability of matching is set to
one and, more signicantly, trade may occur at only one of three exogenously given
prices. In this three-price set up, introduced by Wolinsky (1990), Blouin obtains
results quite di¤erent from ours; for example, each type of trader obtains a positive
(non-competitive) payo¤ even as frictions vanish. This result, which is at odds with
our nding that payo¤s are competitive as frictions vanish, seems to be driven by the
exogeneity of prices. (In our model, prices are determined endogenously without prior
constraints.) In addition, the comparison of the surplus generated in this setting to
the competitive equilibrium surplus depends upon these exogenous prices; since these
prices do not seemingly relate to economic primitives, this comparison is inconclusive.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the market. In section
3 we introduce our model of decentralized trade. In section 4 we present and discuss
our results. In Section 5 we present an example, and we conclude in Section 6 with
a discussion on the appropriate competitive benchmark see also Appendix B for a
formal treatment of this issue. The proofs are presented in Appendix A.
2 A market for Lemons
Consider a market in which there is a continuum of buyers and sellers who trade an
indivisible commodity which can be of either high or low quality. Buyers and sellers
are present in equal measures, which we normalize to one. A measure qH 2 (0; 1) of
the sellers are endowed with a unit of high-quality, and a measure of qL = 1  qH of
sellers are endowed with a unit of low-quality. A seller knows the quality of his good,
but quality is unobservable to buyers. The cost to a seller of a high (low) quality unit
of the good is cH (cL). The value to a buyer of a high (low) quality unit of the good
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is uH (uL). Each type of good is valued more highly by buyers than by sellers (i.e.,
uH > cH and uL > cL), and both buyers and sellers value high quality more than low
quality (i.e., uH > uL and cH > cL). Also we assume that cH > uL, since otherwise
the lemons problem does not arise. Thus, uH > cH > uL > cL: Buyers and sellers
are risk neutral. Hence the expected utility to a buyer of a randomly selected unit of
the good is
u(qH) = qHuH + (1  qH)uL:
In this market the properties of competitive equilibria (CE) depend on whether
average quality is high (relative to values and costs), i.e., u(qH)  cH  0; or average
quality is low, i.e., u(qH)   cH < 0: The supply and demand schedules for each case
are described by gures 1a and 1b, respectively.
Figure 1: Competitive Equilibria
When average quality is low there is a unique CE. In this equilibrium only low-
quality units trade (at the price uL); and the competitive surplus is qL(uL   cL).
When average quality is high there are multiple CE: for every p 2 [cH ; u(qH)] there
is an equilibrium in which all units of both qualities trade at the price p; there is also
an equilibrium in which all low-quality units and some high-quality units trade at the
price p = cH (represented by the dotin Figure 1a); and there is an equilibrium in
which only low-quality units trade at the price uL. The competitive surplus ranges
from qH(uH   cH) + qL(uL   cL) for the e¢ cient CE to qL(uL   cL) for the least
e¢ cient CE.
3 A Decentralized Market for Lemons
Consider the market for lemons described in Section 2, but assume now that the
market operates for innitely many consecutive periods. Each period t a measure
qH 2 (0; 1) of high-quality sellers, a measure qL = 1  qH of low-quality sellers, and a
measure one of buyers enter the market. As in Section 2 we say that average quality
is high when u(qH)  cH  0; and that average quality is low when u(qH)  cH < 0:
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Every buyer (seller) in the market meets a randomly selected seller (buyer) with
probability  2 (0; 1). A matched buyer proposes a price at which to trade. If the
proposed price is accepted by the seller, then the agents trade at that price and both
leave the market. If the proposed price is rejected by the seller, then the agents
remain in the market at the next period. An agent who is unmatched in the current
period also remains in the market at the next period. An agent observes only the
outcomes of his own matches.
If a buyer and a seller trade at the price p; then the instantaneous utility of the
buyer is u   p and that of the seller is p   c; where u = uH and c = cH if the unit
traded is of high quality, and u = uL and c = cL if it is of low quality. Agents discount
utility at a common rate  2 (0; 1).
In this market, a buyer must be ready to make a price o¤er at each date. Thus,
a pure strategy for a buyer is a sequence fptg; where pt 2 R+ is the price she o¤ers
at date t.3 Likewise, a seller must be ready to respond to a price o¤er at each date.
Thus, a pure strategy for a seller is a sequence frtg, where rt 2 R+ is his reservation
price (i.e., the smallest price he accepts) at date t.
Tradersstrategies in the market are described by a probability distribution over
price o¤ers made by buyers, and a probability distribution over reservation prices
employed by each type of seller. Denote by t the c.d.f. of price o¤ers at date t;
i.e., a matched seller is o¤ered p or less with probability t(p). Since in a market
equilibrium traders of the same type must obtain the same expected utility, the
reservation prices of sellers of the same type are identical. Thus, in equilibrium
the distribution of reservation prices employed by each type of seller at each date
is degenerate. Therefore without loss of generality we focus attention on strategy
distributions ft; rHt ; rLt g; where rt 2 R+ is the reservation price used by all sellers of
type  2 fH;Lg at date t:
Market Dynamics
3Price o¤ers are unconditionalsince a buyer doesnt know whether he is matched with a high or
a low quality seller. Also, we consider only strategies in which a trader does not condition his actions
in the current match on the history of his prior matches, but this restriction is inconsequential. Since
a trader only observes the outcomes of his own matches, his decision problem is the same regardless
of his history in prior matches see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), pp. 154-162.
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Let ft; rHt ; rLt g be a strategy distribution. The evolution of the market over time
is described by the stock of sellers of each type and the expected utilities of the traders
in the market at each date t; denoted by (KHt ; K
L
t ) and (V
H
t ; V
L
t ; V
B
t ); respectively.
(We do not keep track of the stock of buyers, assuming implicitly that it is equal to
the stock of sellers at each date. Since the measures of buyers and sellers entering
the market each period are identical, this assumption seems natural.) The laws of
motion for these variables are as follows:
For  2 fH;Lg denote by t the probability that a matched  -quality seller trades
at date t, i.e., the probability that he is o¤ered a price greater than or equal to rt :
This probability is given by
t =
Z 1
0
I(p; rt )dt(p);
where I(p; rt ) is an indicator function, taking the value 1 if p  rt ; and taking the
value zero otherwise. Since a fraction t of the stock of  -quality sellers trade (and
leave the market) at date t; the stock of  -quality sellers at date t+ 1 is
Kt+1 = (1  t )Kt + q . (1)
The payo¤ of a matched seller of quality  2 fH;Lg at date t who is o¤ered a price
p 2 R+ is p   c if p  rt (i.e., if I(p; rt ) = 1) and it is V t+1 if p < rt (i.e., if
I(p; rt ) = 0): The sellers expected utility at date t is therefore given by
V t = 
Z 1
0
 
I(p; rt )(p  c ) + (1  I(p; rt ))V t+1

dt(p) + (1  )V t+1: (2)
Likewise, since a matched buyer meets a  -quality seller with probability Kt =(K
H
t +
KLt ), her payo¤ if she o¤ers the price p 2 R+; which we denote by Bt(p); is given by
Bt(p) =
X
2fH;Lg
Kt
KHt +K
L
t
 
I(p; rt )(u
   p) + (1  I(p; rt ))V Bt+1

:
The expected utility of a buyer at date t is then
V Bt = 
Z 1
0
Bt(p)dt(p) + (1  )V Bt+1: (3)
Stationary Equilibrium
We study stationary market equilibria; that is, equilibria where the distributions
describing the strategies of the traders, and the stocks and expected utilities of the
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traders are constant over time. A steady state is a list [(; rH ; rL); (KH ; KL); (V H ; V L; V B)]
satisfying the system (1)-(3); where the time subscript t is eliminated. The de-
scription of a steady state includes the distribution of price o¤ers made by buyers,
 2 R+; the reservation prices of sellers, rH ; rL 2 R+; the stocks of sellers of each
type, KH ; KL 2 R+; and the expected utilities of the traders V H ; V L; V B 2 R+; at
every period. Note that in a steady state the probability that a matched  -quality
seller trades,  ; and the payo¤ to a matched buyer who o¤ers the price p 2 R+;
B(p); are also constant over time. Also we denote by  the proportion of  -quality
sellers in the stock of sellers, given for  2 fH;Lg by
 =
K
KH +KL
:
A stationary market equilibrium is a steady state where buyers and sellers behave
optimally. Formally:
A stationary market equilibrium is a steady state [(; rH ; rL); (KH ; KL); (V H ; V L; V B)]
satisfying
(ME:) r   c = V  for  2 fH;Lg; and
(ME:B) p 2 argmax
p2R+
B(p) for every p in the support of :
Condition ME: ensures that the reservation price of each type  seller makes him
indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting an o¤er of his reservation price. Condition
ME:B ensures that the price o¤ers made by (almost all) buyers are optimal.
Given a stationary equilibrium, the (ow) surplus, SF ; is the sum of the expected
utilities of the ow of agents entering every period, i.e.,
SF = V B + qHV H + qLV L:
4 Results
The basic properties of stationary market equilibria are established in Proposition 1.
Recall that  is the probability of a price o¤er of r or greater.
Proposition 1. In every stationary market equilibrium:
(P1:1) The reservation price of high-quality sellers is equal to their cost, and is greater
than the reservation price of low-quality sellers (i.e., rH = cH > rL).
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(P1:2) The only prices that may be o¤ered with positive probability are rH (which is
accepted by all sellers), rL (which is accepted only by low-quality sellers), and prices
below rL (which are rejected by all sellers).
(P1:3) The expected utility of high-quality sellers is zero (i.e., V H = 0), the expected
utility of low-quality sellers is positive (i.e., V L > 0); and the expected utility of buyers
is zero whenever rejected o¤ers are made with positive probability (i.e., L < 1 implies
V B = 0):
(P1:4) High-quality sellers remain in the market longer than low-quality sellers (i.e.,
H  L), and are present in the market in a proportion at least as great as the
proportion in which they enter (i.e., H  qH).
The intuition for these results is straightforward: it is easy to see buyers never
o¤er a price above the cost of high-quality sellers, cH .4 Hence the expected utility of
high-quality sellers is zero, and their reservation price is rH = cH : And since delay
is costly, low-quality sellers accept price o¤ers below cH ; i.e., rL < cH = rH . This
implies that the price o¤ers that are accepted by high-quality sellers are also accepted
by low-quality sellers, and therefore the probability that a matched high-quality seller
trades, H ; is less than or equal to the probability that a matched low-quality seller
trades, L; hence high-quality sellers leave the market at a slower rate than low-
quality sellers, and are therefore a larger fraction of the stock of sellers than of the
ow of entrants, i.e., H  qH .
Since buyers make price o¤ers, they keep sellers at their reservation prices; that
is, prices p > rH ; accepted by both types of buyers, or prices in the interval (rL; rH);
accepted only by low-quality sellers, are suboptimal, and are therefore made with
probability zero. Hence a buyer must decide whether: (i) to o¤er a high price, rH ,
thus trading for sure and getting a unit which is of high quality with probability H
and of low quality with probability L = 1  H ; or (ii) to o¤er a low price, rL, thus
trading only if the seller in the match has a unit of low quality (which occurs with
probability L); or (iii) to o¤er a very low price (p < rL), thus not trading for sure.
Of course, if buyers make price o¤ers that are rejected it is because delay has no cost,
that is, because their continuation utility is zero.
In view of Proposition 1, in order to complete the description of the market equi-
4This is the Diamond Paradox see Diamond (1971).
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libria that may arise we need to determine the probabilities with which the three
types of prices, rH ; rL or prices less than rL; are o¤ered. (The expected utility and
reservation price of low-quality sellers, V L and rL; and the expected utility of buy-
ers, V B; can be readily calculated once these probabilities are determined.) Since the
probability of o¤ering a price greater than rH is zero by P1:2, then H is the probabil-
ity of an o¤er of exactly rH : And since prices in the interval (rL; rH) are o¤ered with
probability zero by P1:2; then L H is the probability of an o¤er of exactly rL: The
probability of an o¤er below rL is 1 L. Hence in a stationary market equilibrium the
probabilities H and L determine the distribution of equilibrium transaction prices.
Ignoring the distribution of rejected price o¤ers, which is inconsequential, we describe
a stationary market equilibrium by a list [(H ; L; rH ; rL); (KH ; KL); (V H ; V L; V B)];
where 0  H  L  1:
Proposition 2 below establishes that when frictions are small the values of H and
L depend on whether average quality is high or low. When average quality is high
all price o¤ers are rH (i.e., H = L = 1): In this case, the equilibrium surplus is
smaller than the surplus in the e¢ cient competitive equilibrium (but greater than
the surplus in the least e¢ cient competitive equilibrium). When average quality
is low all three types of price o¤ers rH ; rL and p < rL are made with positive
probability (i.e., H < L < 1): The precise values of H and L are provided in
the proof of Proposition 2 see Appendix A. In this case, the equilibrium surplus
is greater than the surplus in the unique competitive equilibrium: the gains realized
from trading some high-quality units more than o¤-sets the surplus lost due to low-
quality units trading with probability less than one, yielding a net gain in surplus
over the competitive equilibrium surplus in spite of trading frictions.
Proposition 2 establishes also that in either case as frictions vanish each trader
obtains a competitive equilibrium payo¤. Specically, when average quality is high
payo¤s converge to the payo¤s at the competitive equilibrium in which all units
trade at the price cH ; when average quality is low payo¤s converge to the payo¤s at
the unique competitive equilibrium (with price uL). This is remarkable since in the
competitive equilibrium only low-quality units trade, while in the stationary market
equilibrium high-quality units also trade.
Proposition 2. Assume that  is near one.
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(P2:1) If average quality is high, then there is a stationary market equilibrium in
which buyers o¤er rH with probability one (i.e., H = L = 1), and all matched
agents trade. In this equilibrium, if frictions are small but non-negligible, the surplus
is below the surplus at the e¢ cient competitive equilibrium.
(P2:2) If average quality is low, then there is a stationary market equilibrium in which
all three types of prices o¤ers ( rH , rL; and prices less than rL) are made with positive
probability (i.e., 0 < H < L < 1). In this equilibrium, if frictions are small but
non-negligible, the surplus is above the competitive equilibrium surplus.
(P2:3) In these equilibria as  approaches one the tradersexpected utilities approach
their expected utilities at a competitive equilibrium.
The intuition for P2.1 is clear. If all buyers o¤er rH = cH ; then the proportion
of high-quality sellers in the market is the same as the proportion in which they
enter, i.e., H = qH , and therefore an o¤er of cH yields a payo¤ of u(H)   cH =
u(qH)   cH  0. Since a seller is eventually matched and gets an o¤er of cH , for
 is su¢ ciently near one the reservation price of low-quality sellers is near cH ; and
therefore above uL; hence an o¤er of rL yields a negative payo¤ of uL   rL when it
is accepted. Also an o¤er p < rL yields a payo¤ of zero. Therefore it is optimal
for buyers to o¤er rH : Note that this equilibrium generates the same payo¤s (up
to frictions) as the competitive equilibrium where the price is cH ; i.e., decentralized
trade selects an e¢ cient equilibrium outcome recall that when average quality is
high there are multiple competitive equilibria.
When average quality is low, the proof of P2.2 establishes that buyers mix,
making o¤ers of cH (= rH) which are accepted by both types of sellers, o¤ers of uL
(= rL) which are accepted by only low quality-sellers, and very low price o¤ers which
are rejected by both types of sellers. High-quality sellers leave the market slower
than low-quality sellers and are, therefore, present in the market in a proportional
greater than they enter the market (i.e., H > qH). In equilibrium, the proportion of
high-quality sellers in the market is such that the payo¤ to o¤ering cH is zero, i.e.,
u(H) = cH . The equilibrium mixture over price o¤ers is such that a low-quality
seller has a reservation price exactly equal to uL. Since o¤ers of uL are accepted only
by low-quality sellers, the payo¤ to o¤ering uL is also zero. Hence all three types of
price o¤ers yield a payo¤ to zero and each type of o¤er is optimal.
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Buyers and high-quality sellers obtain their competitive surplus (of zero). Low-
quality sellers are indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting a price o¤er of their
reservation price, i.e., rL   cL = V L. As noted above, in equilibrium rL = uL and
hence the expected surplus of low-quality sellers is
V L =
uL   cL

;
which is greater than their static-competitive surplus of uL cL. The surplus obtained
by low-quality sellers from occasionally trading at cH more than o¤sets the surplus
lost due to possibly trading with delay.
As for P2:3, when average quality is high it is easy to see why payo¤s are compet-
itive as frictions vanish: since all price o¤ers are cH , as  approaches one the traders
expected utilities approach their expected utilities at the CE in which the price is cH .
When average quality is low, the surplus of low-quality sellers, V L = (uL   cL)=,
decreases and approaches uL  cL (their competitive surplus) as  approaches one. In
this case, both H and L are decreasing in . Although low-quality sellers become
more patient as  increases, delay also increases and in equilibrium the later e¤ect on
their payo¤s dominates.
Our last proposition establishes that when the gain to trading a high-quality unit
is greater than the gain to trading a low-quality unit, the equilibrium described in
Proposition 2 is unique.
Proposition 3. If  is near one and uH   cH > uL   cL, then there is a unique
stationary equilibrium.
The key result in establishing Proposition 3 is that when  is close to one, in
equilibrium either (i) buyers o¤er rH = cH with probability one (i.e., H = 1), or (ii)
buyers o¤er with positive probability prices which are rejected (i.e., L < 1) see
Lemma 2 in Appendix A. To see why, suppose to the contrary that the only prices
o¤ered with positive probability are rH and rL; i.e., 0 < H < L = 1. An o¤er of rL;
which is accepted only by low-quality sellers, may be optimal only if rL  uL. For
 close to one rL  uL holds only if H ; the probability of a price o¤er of rH = cH ;
is small. But if H is small then high-quality sellers exit the market at a slower rate
(H) than low-quality sellers (who leave the market at the rate ); this implies that
the proportion of high-quality sellers in the stock of sellers, H = qH=(qH + qLH); is
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near one. Hence o¤ering cH yields a payo¤ near uH   cH ; whereas o¤ering rL yields
at most uL   cL: Thus, the single crossing condition,uH   cH > uL   cL; implies
that o¤ering rL is not optimal, and therefore that such a distribution of price o¤ers
is not part of an equilibrium.
When average quality is high the implications of this result are immediate: since
in equilibrium high-quality sellers are present in the market in a proportion at least
as great as the proportion in which they enter by P1:4, i.e., H  qH ; then a price
o¤er of rH = cH yields a positive payo¤, which means that it is not optimal to o¤er
a price which will be rejected (i.e., L = 1). Hence the result above implies that all
buyers o¤er rH (i.e., H = 1).
When average quality is low, since high-quality sellers must exit the market, price
o¤ers of rH must be made with positive probability, and therefore must be optimal,
i.e., u(H)   cH  0. Hence H > qH , and therefore price o¤ers of rL are made
with positive probability as well, i.e., L   H > 0 otherwise both types of sellers
exit the market at the same rate, and H = qH . Hence the result above implies that
price o¤ers which are rejected are also made with positive probability (i.e., L < 1).
Therefore 0 < H < L < 1: (For rH and rL and p < rL to be optimal price o¤ers,
payo¤s must be zero, i.e., u(H)   cH = 0 and rL = uL. These equations uniquely
determine the probabilities H and L see the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix
A.)
5 An Example
Consider a market where uH = 1; cH = 3=5, uL = 2=5, cL = 1=5; qH = 1=5,  = 2=3;
and  > 3=4: Since u(qH)   cH < 0; then average quality is low. The following is a
stationary market equilibrium: H = 3 (1  ) =(2); L = 2H ; rH = 3=5; rL = 2=5;
KH = =[5 (1  )]; KL = 2KH ; V H = 0; V L = 1=(5); and V B = 0: (The condition
 > 3=4 is needed for the values of H and L to be in (0; 1).)
It is easy to check that these values form a steady state. Also, since cH + V H =
3=5 = rH and cL + V L = 2=5 = rL; sellers are setting their reserve prices correctly
(i.e., ME:H andME:L hold). Hence in order to check that this is an equilibrium we
need to check that buyers are behaving optimally; i.e., that all three price o¤ers made
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with positive probability are optimal so that ME:B holds. To see this note that the
proportion of high-quality sellers in the market is H = KH=(KH+KL) = 1=3. Thus
o¤ering rH = cH = 3=5 (which is accepted by both types of sellers) yields
B(rH) =
1
3
(1  3
5
) +
2
3
(
2
5
  3
5
) = 0:
Likewise, o¤ering of rL = uL (which is accepted only by low-quality sellers) yields
B(rL) =
2
3
(
2
5
  2
5
) +
1
3
V B = 0:
Also o¤ering a price p < rL (which is rejected by both types of sellers) yields B(p) =
V B = 0: Therefore all three price o¤ers are optimal.
Note that
uH   cH = 2=5 > 1=5 = uL   cL;
and therefore by Proposition 3 the equilibrium described is the unique stationary
market equilibrium.
In this market the equilibrium surplus is
SF = qLV L =
4
5

1
5

;
which is 1= times the competitive surplus, given by
qL
 
uL   cL = 4
5

1
5

:
When  = :9, the surplus is around 11% greater than the competitive surplus.
Both the surplus and the payo¤ to low-quality sellers, V L; approach (from above)
their values at the competitive equilibrium as  approaches one. The total surplus
falls as  approaches one. As frictions vanish, the probability of an o¤er of rH or rL
also falls, and although low-quality sellers become more patient, the result is a lower
surplus. All these features are not peculiar to the example, but hold generally see
the proof of Proposition 2.2 in Appendix A.
As illustrated by the example, when average quality is low and frictions are small,
equilibrium is characterized by delay. In fact, delay increases as  approaches one.
In the example, if  = :9 then the probability that a high-quality seller trades when
matched (H) is only 1
6
; and the probability that a low-quality seller trades when
matched (L) is 1
3
. Hence the majority of matches end without trade.
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Even though delay may be unavoidable due to the presence of adverse selection,
the delay that traders experience in a decentralized market is ine¢ ciently large. Con-
sider a mechanism that in each match asks the seller to report whether he has a high
or low-quality unit. If the seller reports that he has a high-quality unit, then the
buyer and seller trade with probability ZH = 3
10
at the price 3
5
, and if he reports that
he has a low-quality unit, then they trade with probability ZL = 1 at the price 1
2
. It
is easy to see that for the stocks KH = 1 and KL = 6=5; this mechanism leaves the
market in a steady state: the ow of high-quality sellers leaving the market is
ZHKH = (
2
3
)(
3
10
)(1) =
1
5
= qH ;
and the ow of low-quality sellers leaving the market is
ZLKL = (
2
3
)(1)(
6
5
) =
4
5
= qL:
In this mechanism, the expected utility of a high-quality seller is
V H = ZH(
3
5
  cH) + (1  ZH)V H = 0;
the expected utility of a low-quality seller is
V L = (
1
2
  cL) + (1  )V L = 2
7
;
and the expected utility of a buyer is
V B = [HZH(uH   3
5
) + LZL(uL   1
2
)] + (1  [HZH + LZL])V B = 0:
(Note that H = 5
11
.) Thus, the mechanism is individually rational. The mecha-
nism is also incentive compatible. A matched low-quality seller who reports his type
truthfully obtains
1
2
  cL = 3
10
;
and he also obtains
ZH(
3
5
  cL) + (1  ZH)V L = 3
10
;
if he reports that he is high-quality. Clearly incentive compatibility holds for a high-
quality seller since he obtains zero by reporting his type truthfully, but obtains a
negative payo¤ by reporting he is low-quality. The mechanisms ow surplus is
V B + qHV H + qLV L =
4
5
(
2
7
) =
8
35
:
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In contrast, as we saw earlier, the ow surplus obtained under decentralized trade is
only
4
5

1
5

=
4
5

1
5( 9
10
)

=
8
45
:
Hence equilibrium in a market with decentralized trade and adverse selection is inef-
cient.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that in markets with adverse selection, decentralized trade leads to
competitive payo¤s as frictions vanish. When average quality is high, there are several
competitive equilibria; decentralized trade uniquely selects an e¢ cient competitive
equilibrium. When average quality is low, equilibrium under decentralized trade has
several counter intuitive properties. In particular, while payo¤s are competitive as
frictions vanish, transaction prices and the patterns of trade (i.e., which qualities
trade) are not. In addition, if frictions are small but non-negligible, the surplus
generated under decentralized trade is greater than the competitive surplus, and it
decreases as frictions become smaller.
This last result, that the decentralized surplus is greater than the competitive
surplus, raises the question of whether the static competitive model provides an
appropriate benchmark for competitive outcomes in a dynamic market. For markets
with stationary ows of agents entering it has been shown that the unique stationary
dynamic competitive equilibrium (DCE) is the repetition of the static competitive
equilibrium  see Wooders (1998) for markets for homogeneous goods, and Janssen
and Roy (2004) for markets with adverse selection and a continuum of qualities.
One obtains the same result adapting these denitions of DCE to our setting.5 The
stationary DCE thus provides the same benchmark as the static competitive model.
However, when average quality is low there is a rich set of non-stationary DCE
which exhibit cycles. In these cycles there is an initial phase in which only low-quality
sellers trade (at price uL), while high-quality sellers accumulate in the market; there
is an intermediate phase in which there is no trade; and there is a nal phase in which
5See Appendix B, for a formal denition of DCE, and for a proof that in our setting, when average
quality is low, the unique stationary DCE is the repetition of the (static) competitive equilibrium.
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both qualities trade (at price cH). These non-stationary DCE generate more surplus
than the stationary DCE, and some generate more surplus than the statationary
equilibria of a decentralized market as well.
Table 1 below describes a DCE of this kind for the market in the example of
Section 5 when  = :9.
t pt m
H
t m
L
t m
B
t ut K
H
t K
L
t K
B
t V
L
t
1 low :4 0 :8 :8 :4 :2 :8 1:0 :20
2 low
...
...
...
...
... :4
... 1:2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
7 low
...
... :8 :8
... 1:4 :8 2:2 :20
8 no trade
...
... 0 0
... 1:6 1:6 3:2 :21
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
13 no trade :4 0 0 0 :4 2:6 4:8 7:4 :36
14 high :6 2:8 5:6 8:4 :6 2:8 5:6 8:4 :40
15 low :4 0 :8 :8 :4 :2 :8 1 :20
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Table 1: A non-stationary DCE with interesting properties
The table describes the evolution over the cycle of the market price (column pt), the
measures of trading agents of each type (mHt ; m
L
t and m
B
t ), the expected value to a
buyer of a unit supplied (ut), the stocks of agents of each type (KHt ; K
L
t and K
B
t ),
and the expected utility of a low-quality seller (V Lt ).
In the rst 7 periods of this DCE only low-quality sellers trade (at price uL = :4);
in the following 6 periods there is no trade at all (the price remains at uL); nally
there is a single period in which both qualities trade (at price cH = :6). Low-quality
sellers entering in periods 1 through 7 optimally trade in the period they enter rather
than in period 14. (A low-quality seller entering in period 7, for example, obtains
:4  cL = :2 trading in period 7 but obtains only 7(:6  cL) = :191 trading in period
14.) In contrast, low-quality sellers entering in periods 8 through 13 obtain a payo¤
of at least 6(:6  cL) = :212 if they trade in period 14 at price :6; while their payo¤
is only :2 if they trade in the period they enter at price :4. At period 14 the measures
of high and low-quality sellers accumulated in the market are 2:8 (= :2 14) and 5:6
(= :8  7), respectively. All of these units are supplied at period 14 and hence the
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expected value to a buyer of a unit is :6. The buyerstrading decisions are therefore
optimal since each buyer obtains a payo¤ of zero regardless of the period in which he
trades.6
The DCE in Table 1 generates more surplus than the stationary equilibrium of a
decentralized market. To see this, note that since only low-quality sellers capture any
surplus in both outcomes, only those two surpluses need to be compared. The present
value of the surplus generated in the DCE described in Table 1 over the 14-period
cycle is
P14
t=1 
t 1qLV Lt = 1:404. In contrast, the ow surplus under decentralized
trade is qLV L = qL(uL   cL)=, and the present value of the surplus over 14 periods
is
P14
t=1 
t 1qLV L = 1:371.
This example illustrates that the comparison of surplus under centralized and de-
centralized trade depends on what benchmark one adopts for the competitive surplus.
An apples to apples comparison of the outcomes under centralized and decentralized
trade requires a complete characterization of the set of non-stationary equilibria for
both structures, which seems arduous as these sets are large. If, as is standard in the
literature studying homogenous goods, one adopts the static-competitive benchmark,
then the surplus under decentralized trade is greater when average quality is low and
frictions are small. If one adopts the dynamic-competitive benchmark and restricts
attention to comparing stationary equilibria, the result remains the same.
7 Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions 1 to 3
Proof of Proposition 1. Proposition 1 follows from the results established in
Lemma 1 below. Specically: P1:1 follows from L1:3 and L1:7; P1:2 is restated as
L1:4; P1:3 is implied by L1:5 and L1:6; and P1:4 follows from L1:3; L1:7; and L1:9:
Lemma 1 also establishes other auxiliary results that will be used in the proofs of
propositions 2 and 3.
Lemma 1. In a stationary market equilibrium:
(L1:1) (I(p; rH)  I(p; rL))(p  cH)  (I(p; rH)  I(p; rL))V H for all p 2 R+;
(L1:2) V L   V H < cH   cL;
(L1:3) rH > rL and H  L;
6Proposition B.2 in Appendix B characterizes this class of DCE.
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(L1:4) (p) = (rL) for p 2 (rL; rH); and (rH) = 1;
(L1:5) L < 1 implies V B = 0;
(L1:6) V H = 0 and V L = H(cH   cL)=[1  (1  H)];
(L1:7) rH = cH ;
(L1:8) KH = qH=(H) and KL = qL=(L):
(L1:9) H = qH=[qH + qL(H=L)]  qH :
Proof. Let [(; rH ; rL); (KH ; KL); (V H ; V L; V B)] be a stationary market equilibrium.
We prove L1:1: This inequality trivially holds for p such that I(p; rH)  I(p; rL) = 0.
If I(p; rH)   I(p; rL) = 1 then p  rH : Hence p   cH  rH   cH = V H by ME:H;
and the inequality holds. If I(p; rH)  I(p; rL) =  1 then p < rH and hence p  cH <
rH   cH = V H and so  (p  cH) >  V H .
We prove L1:2. Note that L1:1 implies
I(p; rH)(p  cH) + (1  I(p; rH))V H  I(p; rL)(p  cH) + (1  I(p; rL))V H :
Hence
V H = 
Z 1
0
 
I(p; rH)(p  cH) + (1  I(p; rH))V H d(p) + (1  )V H
 
Z 1
0
 
I(p; rL)(p  cL + cL   cH) + (1  I(p; rL))V H d(p) + (1  )V H
= 
Z 1
0
I(p; rL)(p  cL)d(p) + L(cL   cH) + (1  L)V H
=

1  (1  L)

L(cL   cH) +
Z 1
0
I(p; rL)(p  cL)d(p)

;
Since
V L = 
Z 1
0
I(p; rL)(p  cL)d(p) + (1  L)V L
=

1  (1  L)
Z 1
0
I(p; rL)(p  cL)d(p);
we have
V H  
L(cL   cH)
1  (1  L) + V
L.
Since 
L
1 (1 L) < 1 for  < 1, we have V
L   V H < cH   cL.
Now L1:2 implies cH   cL > (V L   V H); and therefore rH = cH + V H >
cL + V L = rL by ME:H and ME:L. And rH > rL implies H  L: Hence L1:3
holds.
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We prove L1:4: We show that any price o¤er in (rL; rH) yields a payo¤ less than
a price o¤er of rL; hence these prices o¤ers are suboptimal, and therefore are not in
the support of  byME:B. A price o¤er of rL; which is accepted only by low-quality
sellers (i.e., I(rL; rL) = 1 but I(rL; rH) = 0), yields a payo¤
B(rL) =
X
2fH;Lg

 
I(rL; r )(u   rL) + (1  I(rL; r ))V B
= HV B + L(uL   rL):
The payo¤ to o¤ering p 2 (rL; rH); which is also accepted only by low-quality sellers,
is
B(p) =
X
2fH;Lg

 
I(p; r )(u   p) + (1  I(p; r ))V B
= HV B + L(uL   p) < HV B + L(uL   rL) = B(rL):
Analogously, it is easy to see that any price o¤er greater than rH yields a payo¤ less
than a price o¤er of rH ; and is therefore suboptimal.
We prove L1:5. Suppose that L < 1: Hence there is a ~p < rL in the support of
: The payo¤ to o¤ering ~p is
B(~p) =
X
2fH;Lg

 
I(~p; r )(u   ~p) + (1  I(~p; r ))V B = V B:
Since B(~p) = B(p) for all p in the support of  by ME:B; we have
V B = 
Z 1
0
B(p)d(p) + (1  )V B = B(~p) + (1  )V B = V B:
Thus,  < 1 implies V B = 0.
We prove L1:6. Since rH   cH = V H and every price in the support of  satises
p  rH ; we have
V H = 
Z 1
0
 
I(p; rH)(p  cH + rH   rH) + (1  I(p; rH))V H d(p) + (1  )V H
= V H + 
Z 1
0
I(p; rH)
 
p  rH d(p)
 V H :
Again  < 1 and V B  0 imply V H = 0. By L1:4; buyers o¤er rH = cH with
probability H ; rL with probability L   H and a price below rL with probability
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1  L: Hence the expected utility to a low-quality seller is
V L = (H(cH   cL) + (L   H)(rL   cL) + (1  L)V L) + (1  )V L:
Since rL   cL = V L by ME:L; we have
V L = H(cH   cL) + (1  H)V L = 
H(cH   cL)
1  (1  H) :
L1:7 is a direct implication of L1:6 and ME:H:
We prove L1:8. Since a  -quality seller trades with probability  ; for  2 fH;Lg
we have
K = (1   )K + q = q


.
Finally, we prove L1:9: Because H  L by L1:3; we have
H =
KH
KH +KL
=
qH=H
qH=H + qL=L
 qH . 
Since the only price o¤er made with positive probability are rH ; rL and prices less
than rL by L1:4; henceforth we ignore the distribution of rejected price o¤ers, which
as noted earlier is inconsequential, and describe a stationary market equilibrium by
a list [(H ; L; rH ; rL); (KH ; KL); (V H ; V L; V B)]:
Proof of Proposition 2.
We prove P2:1. Assume that average quality is high; i.e., u(qH)  cH . We show
that [(H ; L; rH ; rL); (KH ; KL); (V H ; V L; V B)]; given by H = L = 1, rH = cH ,
rL = cL + (cH   cL)=(1   (1   )); KH = qH=; KL = qL=; V H = 0; V L =
(cH   cL)=(1  (1  )); and V B = (u(qH)  cH)= (1  (1  )) ; is a stationary
market equilibrium. It is easy to check that equations (1) to (3) are satised, and
therefore that the values dened form a steady state. Since rH   cH = V H and
rL   cL = V L; ME:H and ME:L are satised. We show that cH ; the unique price
in the support of ; is an optimal price o¤er, and hence that ME:B is satised.
Since cH = rH > rL is accepted by both types of sellers, a buyer who o¤ers cH
obtains a payo¤ of B(cH) = u(qH)  cH : We show that B(cH)  B(p) for all p 2 R+
which establishes ME:B: If p  cH then I(p; rH) = I(p; rL) = 1; and therefore
B(p) = u(qH)  p  u(qH)  cH = B(cH):
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Now, assume that  < 1 is su¢ ciently near one that uL   rL < 0; i.e.,
uL   cL   (c
H   cL)
1  (1  ) < 0.
(Recall that cH > uL:) For p 2 [rL; cH); we have I(p; rH) = 0 and I(p; rL) = 1; which
implies
B(p) = qL(uL   p) + qHV B  qL(uL   rL) + qHV B < qHV B < V B:
Also for p < rL; we have B(p) = V B: Therefore in either case (i.e., for all p < cH)
we have
B(p)  V B = 
1  (1  )(u(q
H)  cH) < u(qH)  cH = B(cH):
In order to complete the proof of P2:1 we compute the ow surplus. We have
SF = V B + qHV H + qLV L =

1  (1  )(q
H(uH   cH) + qL(uL   cL)):
Since =(1    (1  )) < 1 for  < 1; SF is less than the surplus at the e¢ cient
competitive equilibrium:
We prove P2:2. Assume now that average quality is low; i.e., u(qH) < cH . We
show that [(H ; L; rH ; rL);
 
KH ; KL

;
 
V H ; V L; V B

]; given by
H =
(1  )(uL   cL)
(cH   uL) ;
and
L = H
qL
 
cH   uL
qH (uH   cH) ;
rH = cH ; rL = uL; KH = qH=(H); KL = qL=[(H + L)]; V H = 0, V L =
(uL   cL)=; and V B = 0 is a stationary market equilibrium. Note that u(qH) =
qHuH + qLuL < cH = qHcH + qLcH implies qH(uH   cH) < qL(cH  uL); and therefore
L > H : Moreover, for  close to one H is su¢ ciently small that L < 1. It is easy
to check that equations (1) to (3) are satised, and therefore that the values dened
form a steady state. Since rH   cH = V H and rL   cL = V L; ME:H and ME:L
are satised. We prove that ME:B is also satised.
The proportions of sellers of each type are
H =
KH
KH +KL
=
cH   uL
uH   uL ;
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and L = 1  H ; and the expected utility of a random unit is
u(H) = HuH + LuL = cH :
Hence a price o¤ers of cH(= rH > rL = uL); which is accepted by both types of
buyers, yields
B(cH) = u(H)  cH = 0:
A price o¤er of uL(= rL); which is accepted only by low-quality sellers, yields
B(uL) = L
 
uL   uL+  1  L V B = 0:
And a price o¤er p less than uL(= rL < rH); which is rejected, yields
B(p) = V B = 0:
Hence all three price o¤ers made with positive probability yield a payo¤ of zero. In
order to show that these price o¤ers are optimal, we prove that any price o¤er yields
a non-positive payo¤. Let p 2 R+: If p  cH then the o¤er is accepted by all sellers,
and yields a payo¤ of
B(p) = u(H)  p  u(H)  cH = 0:
If p 2 [uL; cH); then the o¤er is accepted by only low-quality sellers, and yields a
payo¤ of
B(p) = L(uL   p) + (1  L)V B  L(uL   uL) + (1  L)V B = 0:
Finally, if p < uL; then the o¤er is rejected, and yields B(p) = V B = 0: Hence
M:E:B holds.
The equilibrium surplus is
SF = V B + qHV H + qLV L =
qL(uL   cL)

:
Thus, for  < 1 the equilibrium surplus is above the competitive surplus.
We prove of P2:3: If u(qH)  cH , then V H = 0; V L = (cH cL)=(1 (1 )); and
V B = (u(qH) cH)= (1  (1  )) ; and therefore lim!1 V H = 0, lim!1 V L = cH 
cL, and lim!1 V B = u(qH)  cH ; i.e., the tradersexpected utilities converge to their
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expected utilities at the competitive equilibrium with price cH . If u(qH) < cH , then
V H = 0; V L = (cH   cL)=(1  (1 )); and V B = 0; and therefore lim!1 V H = 0,
lim!1 V L = uL  cL, and lim!1 V B = 0; i.e., the tradersexpected utilities converge
to their expected utilities at the competitive equilibrium. 
We now establish Proposition 3 by showing that every stationary equilibrium has
the features described in P2:1 and P2:2. We rst prove an intermediate result.
Lemma 2. Assume that uH   cH > uL  cL: There is a ^ < 1 such that if  2 (^; 1);
then every stationary market equilibrium satises either (i) H = 1 or (ii) L < 1.
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that for every ^ there is a  2 (^; 1) and a
stationary market equilibrium such that neither (i) nor (ii) hold, i.e., H < 1 = L.
Since rL < rH by L1:4; we have
B(rL) = L(uL   rL) + (1  L)V B;
and since rL is in the support of ; we have
V B = B(rL) + (1  )V B = 
L(uL   rL)
(1  L) :
Hence V B  0 implies uL  rL: Since
rL = cL + V L = cL + 
H(cH   cL)
1  (1  H)
by ME:L and and L1:6; then uL  rL can be written as
H  1  

uL   cL
cH   uL :
This bound on H can be made arbitrarily small by choosing ^ su¢ ciently close to 1.
Furthermore, since L = 1 then
H =
KH
KH +KL
=
qH=H
qH=H + qL=L
=
qH
qH + qLH
,
and H is arbitrarily close to 1 for ^ su¢ ciently close to 1. Hence uH   cH > uL  cL
implies that there is a  < 1 such that
u(H)  cH = [HuH + (1  H)uL]  cH > uL   cL:
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Fix a  with this property. Since rL  cL then
u(H)  cH > uL   rL. (4)
A price o¤er of p less than rL(< rH) is rejected, and yields B(p) = V B; since rL is
in the support of ; ME:B implies
B(rL) = L(uL   rL) + HV B  V B:
Because L = 1  H ; this inequality can be written as
uL   rL  V B:
Also a price o¤er of cH (= rH by L1:7) is accepted, and yields B(cH) = u(H)  cH ;
again since rL is in the support of ; ME:B implies
B(rL) = L(uL   rL) + HV B  B(cH) = u(H)  cH :
Hence L + H = 1 and uL   rL  V B implies
uL   rL  L(uL   rL) + HV B  u(H)  cH ;
which contradicts (4). 
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume that uH   cH > uL  cL and that  is su¢ ciently
close to one that the conclusion of Lemma 2 holds. Let us be given a a stationary
equilibrium [(H ; L; rH ; rL); (KH ; KL); (V H ; V L; V B)].
Assume that u(qH)  cH . Then, since H  qH by L1:9, we have u(H) > cH ,
and therefore o¤ering cH (= rH by L1:7) yields B(cH) = u(H)   cH > 0: Then by
ME:B
V B = 
X
2fH;Lg

Z 1
0
B(p)d(p) + (1  ) V B  B(cH) + (1  ) V B > 0:
This implies that L = 1 by L1:5; and therefore H = 1 by Lemma 2. This in turn
implies
V B = B(cH) + (1  ) V B = (u(
H)  cH)
1   (1  ) :
Also, replacing H = 1 in the formula for V L obtained in L1:6 we get
V L =
(cH   cL)
1  (1  ) :
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Now assume that u(qH) < cH . Since KH = qH=(H) by L1:8; then HKH =
qH > 0; and therefore H > 0. Suppose that 0 < H = L; then H = qH (see L1:9),
and therefore o¤ering cH yields
B(cH) = u(H)  cH = u(qH)  cH < 0;
whereas o¤ering p < rL yields a payo¤ B(p) = V B  0: This contradicts ME:B.
Hence L1:3 implies H < L; and therefore H < 1; which in turn implies L < 1
by Lemma 2. Thus 0 < H < L < 1: Also L < 1 implies V B = 0 by L1:5: And
0 < H < L < 1 imply by ME:B that price o¤ers of cH ; of rL; and of less than rL
are optimal; i.e.,
u(H)  cH = L(uL   rL) + HV B = V B = 0:
Since L > 0, this implies rL = uL: And since rL = cL + V L by ME:L; we have
V L = (uL   cL)=:
Finally we show that the values of H and L are those specied in the proof of
P2:2: We have
V L = H(rH   cL) + (1  H)V L = 
H(rH   cL)
1  (1  H) ;
hence
H =
1  

uL   cL
cH   uL :
Furthermore u(H)  cH = 0 implies
cH   uL
uH   uL = 
H =
qH
qH + qL 
H
L
;
and therefore
L = H
qL
qH
cH   uL
uH   cH : 
8 Appendix B: Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium
A dynamic competitive equilibrium is dened as follows see Wooders (1998) for a
similar denition when goods are homogeneous, and Janssen and Roy (2003, 2004)
26
for a denition when there is quality uncertainty. Assume that time runs from 1 to
innity. Let p = fptg be a price sequence in R+ and let K 2 R+. For each  2 fH;Lg
and each t 2 Z+ (the set of positive integers), dene
st (p;K) =
8>><>>:
K if pt   c > maxs2Z+f0; s (pt+s   c )g
[0; K] if pt   c = maxs2Z+f0; s (pt+s   c )g
0 if pt   c < maxs2Z+f0; s (pt+s   c )g;
to be the supply of the  -quality good at date t if there is a measure K of  -quality
sellers in the market. A  -quality seller supplies at date t only if the utility he obtains,
i.e., pt  c , at least as great as the utility s (pt+s   c ) he would obtain by supplying
at date t+ s or by never supplying.
Let u = futg be a sequence of utility values in [uL; uH ], where ut is the expected
value of a random unit drawn from the supply of units at date t.7 For each t dene
dt(p; u;K) =
8>><>>:
K if ut   pt > maxs2Z+f0; s (ut+s   pt+s)g
[0; K] if ut   pt = maxs2Z+f0; s (ut+s   pt+s)g:
0 if ut   pt < maxs2Z+f0; s (ut+s   pt+s)g:
to be demand at date t if there is a measure K of buyers in the market, and the prices
and expected utilities of a random unit are given by p and u, respectively. A buyer
purchases a unit at date t only if the utility he obtains, ut  pt, is at least as great as
the utility he would obtain by purchasing at any later date, or by not purchasing at
all.
A dynamic competitive equilibrium (DCE) is a pair (p;m), where p = fptg is a
sequence in R+ indicating the market price at each date and m = f(mHt ;mLt ;mBt )g
is a sequence in R3+ indicating the measures of agents of each type trading at each
date, satisfying for all t  1:
(DCE:S) for  2 fH;Lg: mt 2 st (p;Kt ); where Kt 2 R+ satises K1 = q and
Kt = K

t 1  mt 1 + q if t > 1.
(DCE:B) mBt 2 dt(p; ut; KBt ); where ut 2 [uL; uH ] satises uH m
H
t
mHt +m
L
t
+uL
mLt
mHt +m
L
t
whenever mHt +m
L
t > 0, and where K
B
t 2 R+ satises KB1 = qB and KBt = KBt 1  
mBt 1 + q
B if t > 1;
7We assume ut 2 [uL; uH ] for each t in order to rule out trivial non-trading equilibria in which
pt < c
L (and therefore no seller supplies at t) and ut < pt (so no buyer demands a unit at date t).
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(DCE:M) mHt +m
L
t = m
B
t .
Condition DCE:S guarantees that seller behavior is optimal. Condition DCE:B
requires that buyers behave optimally and that their expectations are correct. Finally,
condition DCE:M requires that markets clear at every date.
A stationary dynamic competitive equilibrium (SDCE) is a DCE for which the equi-
librium price sequence is a constant sequence.
Even though this denition only requires that the sequence of prices be constant
for a DCE to be stationary, our next proposition establishes that in the case of
interest, i.e., when average quality is low, the unique SDCE generates a stationary
ow of trade.
Proposition B.1. If average quality is low, then there is a unique stationary market
equilibrium, (p;m); given by pt = uL and mt = (0; qL; qL) for all t.
Proof. It is easy to see that pt = uL, mt = (0; qL; qL) for all t; with KLt+1 = q
L,
KHt+1 = K
H
1 + tq
H ; KBt+1 = K
B
1 + tq
H and ut = uL for all t; forms a SDCE. We prove
that this equilibrium is unique. Let (p; u) with pt = p for all t be a SDCE. We show
that p  uL: Suppose that p < uL. We rst show that mBt = KBt for all t. Suppose to
the contrary that mBt < K
B
t for some t. A buyer in the market at date t, by delaying
trade s periods, obtains at most
s(ut+s   p)  s(uH   p).
Hence a buyer delays trade by at most s periods, where s is the largest integer such
that
s(uH   p)  ut   p.
Therefore there is a t0 2 ft+ 1; : : : ; t+ sg such that mBt0 > 0. Hence
t
0 t(ut0   p)  ut   p  uL   p;
where the rst equality follows from DCE:B and the second follows from ut  uL.
Since  < 1 this implies ut0 > uL. DCE:M and mBt0 > 0 imply m
H
t0 + m
L
t0 > 0 and
hence DCE:B implies
ut0 = u
H m
H
t0
mHt0 +m
L
t0
+ uL
mLt0
mHt0 +m
L
t0
:
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But p < uL and uL < cH implies p < cH , and hence mHt0 = 0 by DCE:S. Thus
mLt0 > 0 = m
H
t0 implies ut0 = u
L, a contradiction. Hence mBt = K
B
t 8t. Since p < cH
then mHt = 0 for all t by DCE:S. By DCE:M we have
mLt = m
B
t  mHt = mBt = KBt  qB = 1.
Thus for each t we have
KLt+1 = K
L
t  mLt + qL  KLt   1 + qL = KLt   qH .
This implies KLt < 0 for t su¢ ciently large, a contradiction. This establishes that
p  uL.
We now show that p  uL. Suppose to the contrary that p > uL. Then mLt =
KLt  qL > 0 for all t by DCE:S. Condition DCE:M implies mBt > 0 for all t; and
then DCE:B implies ut   p  0. We have mBt > 0 and mBt = mLt +mHt by DCE:M
and therefore ut is given by DCE:B. Thus ut  p > uL implies mHt > 0 which,
together with DCE:S, implies p  cH . Hence DCE:B implies ut  cH .
As noted earlier, mLt = K
L
t and hence K
L
t = q
L for all t. Hence we have
ut = u
H m
H
t
mHt + q
L
+ uL
qL
mHt + q
L
 cH .
Let ~m be such that
uH
~m
~m+ qL
+ uL
qL
~m+ qL
= cH .
Since ut  cH then mHt  ~m, and since average quality is low then ~m > qH . Thus
for each t we have
KHt+1 = K
H
t  mHt + qH  KHt   ~m+ qH < KHt :
This implies KHt < 0 for t su¢ ciently large, a contradiction. This establishes that
p  uL.
We have shown p  uL and p  uL, and hence p = uL in any SDCE. Since
cL < uL = p < cH , then DCE:S implies mHt = s
H
t (p;K
H
t ) = 0 for all t and m
L
t =
sLt (p;K
L
t ) = K
L
t for all t, and therefore m
L
t = q
L for all t. 
Proposition B.2. Assume that time runs from 1 to 1 and  is su¢ ciently large
that (cH   cL)  uL   cL. Let l; n and h be three positive integers satisfying
n(cH   cL)  uL   cL  n+1(cH   cL) ()
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and
(l + n+ h)qH  (n+ h)qL c
H   uL
uH   cH : ()
(i) When average quality is low there are non-stationary DCE with cycles with three
phases. The initial phase lasts l periods, the price is uL and only low-quality units
trade; the intermediate phase lasts n periods, the price is uL, and there is no trade;
the nal phase lasts h periods, the price is cH and both high and low quality units
trade.
(ii) There are non-stationary three-phase DCE which generate more surplus than the
stationary DCE.
Proof: Let ~m be such that
uH
~m
~m+ qL
+ uL
qL
~m+ qL
= cH ,
i.e., ~m = qL c
H uL
uH cH . Since average quality is low, then ~m > q
H . Let (p;m) be given
for t 2 f1; : : : ; l + n+ hg by
t pt m
L
t m
H
t m
B
t
1 uL qL 0 qL
...
...
...
...
...
l
... qL
... qL
l + 1
... 0
... 0
...
...
...
...
...
l + n uL 0 0 0
l + n+ 1 cH (n+ 1)qL (n+ 1) ~m (n+ 1)(qL + ~m)
l + n+ 2
... qL ~m qL + ~m
...
...
...
...
...
l + n+ h cH qL ~m qL + ~m
and for t > l + n+ h; let pt = pt (l+n+h); and mt = m

t (l+n+h) for  2 fH;L;Bg.
We show that this pair, together with
Kt+1 = K

t  mt + q ,
for all t; and ut = uL for t 2 f1; : : : ; l + ng; ut = cH for t 2 fl + n + 1; :::; l + n + hg
and ut = ut (l+n+h) for t > l + n+ h; forms a DCE
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By constructionDCE:M is satised. Equation (**) implies that in period l+n+h
we have KHl+n+h  mHl+n+h. We show that DCE:S holds. A low-quality seller in the
market in period t 2 f1; : : : ; lg optimally trades at either t (obtaining utility uL cL),
or at period l + n+ 1 (obtaining l+n+1 t(cH   cL)). For each t 2 f1; : : : ; lg we have
uL   cL  n+1(cH   cL)  l+n+1 t(cH   cL);
where the rst inequality holds by (*). Thus mLt = K
L
t 2 sLt (p;KLt ) for t 2 f1; : : : ; lg.
A low-quality seller in the market at period t 2 fl + 1; : : : ; l + ng optimally trades
either at t or at period l + n+ 1. For each t 2 fl + 1; : : : ; l + ng we have
uL   cL  n(cH   cL)  l+n+1 t(cH   cL);
where the rst inequality holds by (*). ThusmLt = 0 2 sLt (p;KLt ) for t 2 fl+1; : : : ; l+
ng. Since cH > uL > cL, clearlymLt = KLt = sLt (p;KLt ) for t 2 fl+n+1; : : : ; l+n+hg.
For high-quality sellers we have
sHt (p;K
H
t ) =
8<: 0 if t 2 f1; : : : ; l + ng[0; KHt ] if t 2 fl + n+ 1; : : : ; l + n+ hg.
Clearly mHt = 0 2 sHt (p;KHt ) for t 2 f1;. . . ; l + ng. We show mHt = (n+ 1) ~m 2
sHt (p;K
H
t ) for t = l + n+ 1. We have
KHl+n+1 = (l + n+ 1)q
H
 (l + n+ 1)qH + (h  1)  qH   ~m
= (l + n+ h)qH   (h  1) ~m
 (n+ 1) ~m
where the rst inequality follow from ~m > qH the last inequality follows from (**).
For s 2 f2; : : : ; hg we have
KHl+n+s = (l + n+ s)q
H   (n+ s  1) ~m
 (l + n+ s)qH   (n+ s  1) ~m+ (h  s)(qH   ~m)
= (l + n+ h)qH   (n+ h  1) ~m
 ~m;
where the last inequality follows from (**). Hence mHt = ~m 2 sHt (p;KHt ) for t 2
fl + n+ 2; : : : ; l + n+ hg. Therefore DCE:S holds.
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In order to complete the proof we show that DCE:B holds. Since pt = ut for all
t, we have
dt(p; u;K
B
t ) = [0; K
B
t ]
for all t: We have already established that mHt 2 [0; KHt ] and mLt 2 [0; KLt ] for all t.
Since KBt = K
H
t +K
L
t , then m
B
t = m
H
t +m
L
t 2 [0; KHt +KLt ] = dt(p; u;KBt ). Hence
DCE:B holds.
Table 1 in Section 6 describes an example of a DCE in this class (in which h = 1)
that generates more surplus than the stationary DCE. 
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